Unveiling of headstone for Patsy Dougan in the Bronx

See here for a link to a story in the Irish Echo about the unveiling of headstone at the New York grave of Patrick Dougan, a volunteer in D Company, first Battalion, of the IRA’s Belfast Brigade during 1919-1921. On 30th May 1937 he died of pneumonia and had been buried in an unmarked grave in St Raymond’s Cemetery in the Bronx.

Patsy Dougan

Patsy Duggan (see Irish Echo article linked at the start of the post)

Dougan was one the Belfast IRA volunteers who was arrested in Lappanduff in Cavan on 8th May 1921 while serving in a flying column. The flying column had been recruited through Seamus McGoran who had transferred from the Belfast Brigade to become O/C of the East Cavan Brigade. The thirteen strong flying column was led by Joe Magee and included Patrick Dougan, Sean McCartney and Johnny McDermott from D Company. They arrived in Cavan between the 3rd or 4th of May and the 6th (when McCartney arrived) and were to be reinforced by a further 10-12 men before going in to action. In the meantime they had cleaned up the cottages in which they were staying and began cleaning and sorting their arms and ammunition. Several of the men, including Patrick Dougan and Sean McCartney, were experienced ex-servicemen who had served in the first world war. Dougan had served under an assumed name (William Cairns).

On the night of Saturday 7th May, Magee gave permission for three of the men to visit a pub McCartney had spotted around a mile from where they were staying. According to Seamus McKenna (Magee’s second in command), the sudden appearance of Belfast men in the pub would have aroused suspicion. He also noted that two of the three were ex-servicemen saying they “…were anything but discreet and I have no doubt that their tongues wagged.” At 1 am that night McGoran arrived with another former Belfast IRA volunteer, Tom Fox, who was his Brigade engineer while some locals delivered further supplies to the flying column. They were accompanied by two local Cavan IRA leaders. Further reinforcements were also expected.

Two sentries had been posted for two hours watches through the night and at 4 am, one spotted some movement at the foot of the hill below the house. When another member of the flying column went about fifty yards from the house to get water he also some movement and waved, thinking it was the reinforcements. A number of shots fired at him made him realise it was a military party. The shots also awakened the rest of the flying column. Magee ordered the men to take up defensive positions and sent McCartney and McDermott out to reconnoitre the foot of the hill. According to the British record of the incident, soldiers and RIC constables searching for an IRA organiser stumbled upon the flying column outside a house on Lappanduff mountain.

As the British took cover around a farmhouse and the flying column took cover around the house they had been using and both sides exchanged rifle fire. McKenna observed McCartney and McDermott under heavy fire running across a field at the foot of the hill to return to their position. McCartney was shot dead and McDermott, realising he couldn’t help him, continued up towards the flying column’s position. Around their position, men began to move out and several escaped the net of soldiers, RIC and Black and Tans. McGoran, Seamus Heron and Patrick Dougan had taken up a position to the rear of Seamus McKenna. Just below him, Seamus Finn collapsed, having been wounded. Patrick Dougan volunteered to go down to assist Finn. Despite heavy gunfire he managed to crawl down to Finn who could be clearly heard moaning. With the flying column separated into groups and pinned down, eventually Seamus McKenna offered to surrender as they were unable to return fire. The gun battle had lasted around two hours. Nine of the Belfast men and two of the Cavan volunteers were captured but the others, including McGoran, Heron and Magee, had managed to escape. Patrick Dougan would probably have escaped had he stayed with Heron and McGoran rather than go to the aid of Seamus Finn.

After the surrender there was some ill-treatment as the prisoners were beaten by the RIC and Black and Tans, with Peter Callaghan received a head injury after being struck with a rifle butt. However, the British soldiers removed the prisoners who were brought to Victoria Barracks in Belfast where they were all sentence to death on 11th July 1921. As the truce came in to force the sentence wasn’t carried and Patrick Dougan was moved first to Mountjoy then released in 1922.

The Dougans had lived at Panton Street and Cupar Street but by the 1930s they had moved to Peel Street. This was the address used for Patrick when the Belfast Brigade records for 1916-1922 were compiled. His brothers Dan and James were also active in the IRA, his father John had been in the IRB and the family had a long history of involvement as republicans.

In April 1930, Patrick emigrated to the United States, taking ship to New York. His emigration papers give his occupation as ‘coal merchant’ (by this time he was living in Kane Street). As the Irish Echo article notes, he died of pneumonia on the 30th May 1937. His death wasn’t overlooked in Ireland as some of the newspapers did report it, such as the Leitrim Observer (15th May 1937).

This is merely scratching the surface of Patsy Dougan’s life. You can read more about him here in a great piece by Michael Jackson (based on research by Dougan’s nephew Tomás Ó Dubhagáin).

 

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BBC apology to the British Army over its coverage of the British Army’s killing of Fr Hugh Mullan, #BallymurphyMassacre

On the 10th August 1971 the BBC was already reporting on the killings in Ballymurphy from the previous day and stating that an eyewitness was “…putting the blame fairly and squarely on the British Army”. The BBC quickly became the subject of attacks by the British government for its reporting on the actions of the Parachute Regiment. The British Defence Minister Lord Carrington even accused the BBC of “sniping” at the British Army and indulging in propaganda. The BBC called it an “error of judgement”.

On 9th August 1971, a neighbour of Fr Hugh Mullan, Bobby Clarke, was shot by soldiers after lifting a child to safety during the violence that followed the mass arrest of ‘Catholics’ that morning. After ringing the British Army HQ to advise them that he was going out to administer the last rites to Clarke, Fr Mullan ventured out, waving a white cloth and dressed as a priest, only to discover that Clarke was not fatally injured. He attempted to leave to get an ambulance for Clarke at which point he was shot by a British soldier. Frank Quinn, who attempted to provide assistance, was also shot dead.

Coverage of Fr Mullan’s death included an interview with the local Catholic bishop, William Philbin, broadcast on BBC the next day. The same day Bobby Clarke was also interviewed on the BBC Radio 4 programme, World at One, where he gave an eye witness account of Fr Mullan being shot in the back by a British soldier. Reporting of Fr Mullan’s death in many of the British newspapers repeated the claim that he had been shot as he went to administer the last rites to a wounded gunman.

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Fr Hugh Mullan

After the items were broadcast the Conservative MP for Dorset South, Evelyn King, wrote to Lord Carrington accusing the BBC of irresponsibility and “sniping” at the Army. Obviously, the use of the word ‘sniping’ was deliberate as this was the term conventionally used by reporters when describing physical attacks on the British Army in the north. The intention was clearly to use the term to associate the views of the BBC with those that were actually ‘sniping’ at the British Army. This is pretty unsophisticated censorship in that it is intended to diminish future reporting critical of the British Army as merely ‘sniping’ from the BBC.

Carrington responded to King’s letter by writing to the head of the BBC, Lord Hill, and King, stating that the radio interview in particular “…fell below the standard of fairness and accuracy people were entitled to expect” although he included other unspecified BBC items in his criticism. Carrington also seemed to be concerned that the items were also an attack on him personally since he had expressed his ‘utmost gratitude’ on the BBC for what the British Army had done. In his letter, Carrington admonished the BBC that when its “reporting falls below the standard of fairness and accuracy which we are entitled to expect, the main effect is to damage the corporation’s own standing with the public”. It should be borne in mind that, at this time in 1971, British public opinion on the deployment troops in the north wasn’t clear as there were calls for troops to be withdrawn both from the likes of the New Statesman and the National Front (see, eg, Irish Press, 24th August 1971). The latter even advocated Irish reunification, although it also wanted the forced repatriation of all Irish from Britain on the grounds that they were all mere “white wogs”.

The BBC accepted Carrington and Kings criticism and stated that “We do not defend the use of the item on the shooting of Fr Mullan. In our view it was an error of judgement to use this part of the interview.” However the BBC did reject the overall criticism.

You can read the letter here (thanks to @papertrailpro): https://twitter.com/papertrailpro/status/1042342802867347457?s=21

While this may seem like another footnote to the broader issue of the behaviour of the parachute regiment in Ballymurphy between 9th and 11th August 1971, it points to one of the wider issues that is not yet satisfactorily addressed. The role of the media lies both in reporting events and ensuring that those in positions of responsibility are suitably held to account. This means it is critical to understand how the media subsequently reported on events and what influenced how the media framed their reporting. The potential chilling effect of criticism, such as came from Lord Carrington, is fairly obvious. The long term repercussions, though, are significant. A glaring omission from contemporary media coverage of ‘legacy’ cases involving individuals killed or injured by state forces is a clear articulation by the media of what differentiates these cases from other violent conflict deaths. For those unsure what that means: when a meaningful inquest or investigation of the circumstances has not occurred the default position is that the information given by the British Army (etc) becomes the official account of a death. Fr Hugh Mullan, like others killed by the state, is thus deemed as being culpable in his own death unless the British Army itself, or some legal process, formally recognises the killing was unjustified. It is solely victims of the state that are, in this way, deemed guilty until proven otherwise. The repeated failures to hold the state and its leading figures to account is one legacy of the real error in judgement of the BBC (and media in general) in allowing itself to become the propaganda tool of the likes of Lord Carrington.

You can read a balanced item about Fr Hugh Mullan on the BBC here along with footage of the interview with the Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor, Dr William Philbin, on the day following his death (note the video may not work in every territory).

Here is the full text of a longish article on the BBC admitting an “error judgement” following Lord Carrington’s letter, as published in the Birmingham Daily Post 20th August 1971:

Interview about shot priest was an error: BBC

The BBC admitted yesterday that its use of part of an interview on the death of a Roman Catholic priest in Northern Ireland was an error in judgement.
BBC Radio 4’s The Word at One programme on August 10 carried an item on the death of a Roman Catholic priest, Fr Hugh Mullan, the day before.
The item took the form of an interview with an unnamed Irishman who claimed to be the man to whom the priest was giving the last rites when he was shot. The man alleged that the priest had been shot in the back by a British soldier.

Army blamed
The programme chairman, Mr William Hardcastle, summed up: “An eyewitness putting the blame fairly and squarely on the British Army.”
But the Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington in letters to a Conservative MP Mr Evelyn King (Dorset S) and the BBC chairman, Lord Hill, has said that the item fell below the standard of fairness and accuracy people were entitled to expect.
Mr King had written to Lord Carrington accusing the BBC of irresponsibility and “sniping” at the Army in its coverage of the Northern Ireland crisis.
In his reply to Mr King, Lord Carrington said: “I can assure you that the BBC items on Northern Ireland which you mention have not gone unnoticed by my Department. They are not the only items in this category.”
He then cited as an additional example, the item arising from the death of Fr Mullan and recalled that he had taken part in an interview on BBC Television News.
“I took the opportunity to express the utmost gratitude for the work of the Army in Northern Ireland. I believe quite firmly that this admiration and gratitude is shared by the vast majority of the people of this country and that, on those occasions when the BBC’s reporting falls below the standard of fairness and accuracy which we are entitled to expect, the main effect is to damage the corporation’s own standing with the public.”
In his letter to Lord Hill, Lord Carrington said: “I hope my letter to Mr King makes it clear that I certainly do not regard all the BBC’s recent reports and discussions on Northern Ireland as unbalanced and unfair.”
But he was concerned about the instances cited.
“I hope you will agree that they are unsatisfactory and that everything possible should be done to prevent repetitions.”
Last night a BBC spokesman said “We do not defend the use of the item on the shooting of Fr Mullan. In our view it was an error of judgement to use this part of the interview.”

Difficult task
But the BBC reacted sharply to Mr King’s accusations of daily “sniping” and indulging in propaganda.
The spokesman said, “These accusations are deeply wounding to staff who are engaged in the difficult task of reporting the terrible events in Northern Ireland. Much that we have to report will be unwelcome to one of the many conflicting interests involved and there will be occasional errors of judgement. But to accuse the BBC of sniping and propaganda is unworthy. We reject the accusation entirely.”

IRA memo from Chief of Staff, 13th June 1942

 

 

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Memo, Chief of Staff, IRA, to Director of Publicity, Northern Command, 13th June 1942.

This is an rare example of a surviving internal IRA memo from 1942. Sent from the department of the Chief of Staff, GHQ to the Director of Publicity, Northern Command on 13th June 1942.

At the time, the Chief of Staff of the IRA was Hugh McAteer, while the Director of Publicity in the Northern Command was John Graham. The memo covers the IRA’s attitude towards American troops in the north following the entry of the US into the world war in 1941. In the IRA’s view, the stationing of any troops on Irish soil (British, German or American) could only happen with the consent of what was seen as the legitimate government of Ireland. According to the IRA, this was the IRA. While this may seem laughable, de Valera had taken a somewhat similar view of the deployment of American troops in Ireland. His constitution, enacted in 1937, retained the claim to authority over the whole of the island of Ireland and, as such, de Valera believed that the deployment of US troops in the north should only have happened following consultation with his government.

As fanciful as this may all seem, there was a significant Irish-American lobby which could be mobilised. When the IRA Chief of Staff was detained in the United States at the behest of the British government in 1939, seventy-six members of Congress threatened to boycott an official event welcoming the British king on an official visit. After September 1939, there was pressure from Irish-America to make US aid for British war efforts conditional upon the British government addressing the issue of partition in Ireland.

Indeed, the IRA had continuously positioned it’s own strategy with an eye on, at the very least, avoiding damage to de Valera and Fianna Fáil’s ascent to power in the 1920s and 1930s in the expectation that, once in power, they would seek to end partition and create an Irish republic along the line of the republic declared in 1916. By the late 1930s it was apparent that this was not going to be the case and, in the short term, the possibility of leveraging Irish-America towards the same end replaced the IRA’s long term hopes for de Valera.

The IRA memo of 13th June 1942 was in the Director of Publicity’s Northern Command HQ when it was raided by the RUC on 10th September that year and, as it was used as a crown exhibit in the trial of Graham and David Fleming, it has survived in the Public Records Office.

Belfast Battalion available as ebook from today…

You can now read the newly published book on the Belfast IRA (1922-1969).

Ahead of schedule, I know, but the ebook/Kindle edition of Belfast Battalion has already gone live on Amazon at the link below (where you can also get a preview).

Anyone who doesn’t use Kindle or ebooks can read a sample chapter below. The plan is to have the printed book available by 1st November (you can still add your email to get updates here). By the way – if you’re kind enough to get the ebook version – don’t forget to give it some stars or a review.

book teaser…

Coming very soon, Belfast Battalion: a history of the Belfast I.R.A. 1922-69. Likely see ebook launched in October, print copies will be available for delivery/distribution in November.

Watch this space…

You can add your email below for updates on when the book is available.